ultimately matters" ( ¶21). Although the word "philosophy" never appears in the Euthyphro, Strauss features it prominently. His lecture is not about piety in the abstract; it is especially about piety in relationship to philosophy or knowledge more generally, and it typically treats them as incompatible alternatives.3 Strauss implies we might prefer to find a compromise than to confront piety and philosophy as starkly opposed alternatives, but we cannot "eat the cake and have it" ( ¶21, p. 21t). A related set of opposed alternatives guides the discussion especially in paragraphs 14-17: Are the primary beings gods or ideas? ( ¶17, p. 17t). If they are ideas, knowledge may be possible; if they are gods, knowledge is not possible, for there is nothing permanent for the knower to know. Strauss calls the alternative between gods and ideas "so extreme that one would be very glad if it could be evaded" ( ¶15, p. 16t). He even experiments with a way of evading this extreme alternative, but he appears to deem it unsuccessful ( ¶16). Strauss returns frequently to this theme: the Euthyphro teaches that we face a choice or tension between stark alternatives, gods or ideas. The most apt response to the former is piety, to the latter philosophy.4
But there is a second prominent candidate for the most memorable conclusion of the lecture, one that presupposes but goes beyond the point just made. It is that one of these two extreme alternatives is superior to the other, at least on the basis of the Euthyphro, which teaches "that piety is superfluous and that the gods are superfluous except for the many" ( ¶20, p. 20m). If we heard above that the ideas (and philosophy) and the gods (and piety) are alternatives, this passage dismisses the gods and piety as superfluous. As we shall soon see, it does so in favor of the ideas. Several other important passages also have philosophy and piety not as alternatives of equal rank but with the former in a position superior to the latter. If Socrates is pious, for example, piety is a virtue ( ¶2). If he is not, it is not.5 Strauss also says that Socrates "transcends the dimension of the ordinary arts and virtues" in the direction of philosophy, whereas Euthyphro does so in the direction of "spurious knowledge" ( ¶11, p. 13t). But how does Socrates' position establish itself as the superior one? How does philosophy earn the right to judge between "gods or ideas"? Does
